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The law governing employment is of vast compass. Among the
subjects it embraces are racial and sexual discrimination in employment, the liability of an employer ("master") for the torts of
his employees ("servants"), the regulation of occupational health
and safety, employees' rights under the pension-regulation law
(ERISA), the emerging tort of wrongful discharge of an employee
at will, and much else besides. But, to lawyers anyway, the most
important subject in the law of employment, as measured by the
number of cases, the density of legal doctrine, and other measures
of legal activity, remains-even in a period of union decline-the
regulation by the National Labor Relations Board of the process
by which unions seek to bargain collectively on behalf of workers.1
This regulation is conducted under the authority of the National
Labor Relations Act,2 which is the Wagner Act of 1935,3 as
amended, principally by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.1 When I use
the term "labor law" in this paper, I shall, unless otherwise indicated, be referring to this regulatory scheme, even though properly
speaking it is just a part of a much larger field.
Whether defined broadly or, as I am doing, narrowly, labor law
is as natural a field for the application of economics to law as one
could imagine. It regulates explicit markets that have been a subject of continuous and fruitful economic study since Adam Smith's
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day. 5 And though in recent years the focus of labor economics has
shifted from unions to other phenomena of labor markets," such as
human capital and employment discrimination, there is a
rich-and reviving-contemporary literature on the economics of
unions.' Moreover, as I shall argue in this paper, a well-developed
field of economic analysis outside of labor economics-the economic analysis of cartels-can yield to the student of the legal regulation of unionizing many insights.
Yet despite abundant opportunity, there has been relatively
little writing in an economic vein about the particulars of labor
law, especially-and especially surprisingly-of labor law as I am
narrowly defining it. 8 There are, I conjecture (a word used advisedly), two reasons for this situation. The first is that because labor
law is doctrinally complex (much more so than antitrust, the economists' favorite field of law), economists have not found it accessible in the way they have found antitrust law, and more recently

'

For a summary of the economics of labor, see R. EHRENBERG & R. SMrrH, MODERN
LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982); see also THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE
UNIONS: NEw DIRECTIONS (J. Rosa ed. 1984); F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, LABOR
ECONOMICS: WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND TRADE UNIONISM (4th ed. 1980). A notable contribution, highly pertinent to the theme of this article, is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTVE ACTION 66-97 (1965). The current periodical literature is well-illustrated by Lazear, A

Competitive Theory of Monopoly Unionism, 73 Am. EcoN. REV. 631 (1983).
6 See Johnson, Economic Analysis of Trade Unionism, 65 Am. ECON. REV. PAPERS &
PROC. 23 (May 1975).
7 See, e.g., NEw APPROACHES TO LABOR UNIONS (J. Reid ed.) (Research in Labor Economics Supp. 2, 1983); ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS (2d rev. ed. 1977);
sources cited supra notes 5-6.
8 Some exceptions to this generalization should be noted. There is an economically informed literature on the application of the antitrust laws to the union activities that are not
exempt from those laws. See, e.g., Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts
and Labor Antitrust, 89 HARv. L. REv. 904 (1976); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 659 (1965). There is, of course, an
extensive economic literature on the effects of laws regulating wages and hours, industrial
health and safety, and employment discrimination. Wrongful discharge is a new area of labor law that has received interesting economic treatment recently. See Epstein, In Defense
of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984); Harrison, The "New" Terminableat-Will Employment Contract:An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IowA L. REV.
327 (1984). But economic analyses of specific provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
appear to be rare, although I do not pretend to have made a complete search of the literature. I have found a few brief analyses of such provisions by economists. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 380-82 (3d ed. 1984); Alchian, Decision Sharing
and ExpropriableSpecific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 S. CT. ECON. REv. 235 (1982). Some contributions of economically minded
lawyers are cited infra notes 9 & 21. The legal community is not unaware of the economic
literature on unions-quite the contrary. See, e.g., BERNARD D. MELTzER, LABOR LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 37-94 (2d ed. 1977). But for the most part that literature has not
yet been brought to bear on particular provisions of the NLRA.
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tort law, accessible. The second reason is that because labor law is
(as we shall see) founded on a policy that is the opposite of the
policies of competition and economic efficiency that most economists support, the field is unlikely to attract, as a subject for teaching and scholarship, the lawyer who is deeply committed to economic analysis; it is likely to repel him. Of course, you don't have
to agree with the normative premises of a field to find it a worthwhile subject for teaching and scholarship. But the fact is-I suppose it reflects the lawyer's training in advocacy-that it is rare for
a law professor to make a sustained commitment to a field for
whose premises he feels no sympathy at all.
Nevertheless, and somewhat ironically since unions have been
in decline in the United States, England, and other countries in
recent years, the last few months have seen the appearance of several interesting papers in which economic analysis is brought to
bear (in very different ways) on specific problems of labor law in
my narrow sense of the term.'
One task I have set myself in this paper is simply to make
labor law less mysterious to economists, in the hope that they will
be encouraged to overcome a natural resistance to immersion in
complex legal doctrine. I shall begin therefore with a brief sketch
of the American system of labor law and then propose a simple
economic model of that system. My basic thesis will be that American labor law is best understood as a device for facilitating, though
not to the maximum possible extent, the cartelization of the labor
supply by unions. Lest this seem an impolitic (especially for a
judge) condemnation of the union movement, I emphasize that I
am using the word "cartelization" in a nonpejorative, technical
sense: it is the cooperative endeavor of competing sellers to raise
the prices of their goods or services (here labor services) above the
level that would prevail under conditions of unregulated competition. I take no position on whether it is socially preferable for the
price of labor to be determined on a competitive or on a cartelized
basis. My analysis is positive, not normative.
0 See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations:A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Epstein, Common Law]; Epstein,
Agency Costs, Employment Contracts,and Labor Values, in THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP (J.
Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. forthcoming); Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REv.
353 (1984). Professor Epstein's papers sound themes very similar to those that I develop in
this paper. It may be significant that neither of us is a specialist in labor law.
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I.

AMERICAN LABOR LAW

Professor Richard Epstein has conducted a very useful survey
of the position of the common law with regard to labor unions.' 0
Although that position is typically and not inaccurately described
as "anti-union," Professor Epstein shows that it could just as well
be called "pro-competitive," or, as some economic analysts of the
common law would have it, "pro-efficiency." ' "1 At common law, labor unions were recognized for what they were: worker cartels12
designed to raise the price of labor above the competitive level.
Picketing, too, was recognized for what it was: an attempt to interfere, by means inherently intimidating, with contractual relationships between the picketed firm and its customers and suppliers,
including new workers hired to replace the strikers. 3 So-called
"yellow dog" contracts (under which workers agreed not to join unions during the term of their employment) were enforced on the
assumption, congenial to classical economic thinking, that the
4
worker was compensated for giving up his right to join a union.' If

he was not generously compensated, that was nothing to worry
about; compensation for not combining with other workers to create a labor monopoly is itself a form of monopoly rent.
It can of course be argued that this picture of an efficient common law of labor relations rests on unrealistic premises about the
nature of labor markets, especially in the years prior to the revolution in labor law brought about by the Wagner Act in 1935. If
many workers were ignorant of their alternative employment opportunities, wages would frequently have been below the competitive level. If many workers (especially, perhaps, older workers)
would have incurred heavy costs by changing jobs, maybe because
they had become specialized to a particular employer's methods or
had developed close social and family ties to a particular community or rbgion, employers would have monopsony power, and the
workers might be paid less than a competitive wage.' 5 If, as Adam
Smith believed, conspiracies among employers to depress wages
10See Epstein, Common Law, supra note 9, at 1358-86.
21 This finding provides additional support for the thesis, which I have expounded elsewhere, that the common law is on the whole efficiency-promoting. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOwC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25-191 (2d ed. 1977).
'2 See SELIG PERLMAN, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIoNIsM IN =
UNITED STATES 147
(1922).
13 See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 97-98, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
14 See generally Epstein, Common Law, supra note 9, at 1370-75, 1382-85.

15 This description is not wholly accurate; the situation would be one of bilateral monopoly since specialization would also tend to give the workers monopoly power.
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were common,16 this would be another source of monopsony power.
These conditions may have been common in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries in this country, when there were low
levels of worker education, a great deal of immigrant labor, a limited number of employers in some markets, no serious enforcement
of antitrust laws against employer cartels, and some obstacles to
labor mobility (though Americans have always moved around a
lot).17 But against all this must be set the facts that in the great
era of immigration between the Civil War and the end of unrestricted immigration after World War I, America had a chronic
labor shortage, which was the main reason for the great immigration; that wages were much higher in the United States than in the
rest of the world; and that competition for workers must have been
intense and should have limited the extent of monopsony power in
labor markets.1 8
Even assuming that American labor markets were substantially distorted from the competitive norm in ways that unions
might have alleviated, 9 by 1935 these distortions must have been
largely in the past (they certainly have a quaint ring today). But
whether economically justified or not, the Wagner Act brought
about a revolution in the American law of labor relations. The
common law was displaced by a system of federal regulation administered by a new agency, the National Labor Relations Board,
and designed-as its sponsors and supporters made clear2 " and as
is anyway obvious from the structure of the Act-to foster unionization. In the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress redressed the
Wagner Act's tilt toward unions somewhat. Legislative and judicial
16ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 66-67 (Mod. Lib. reprint 1937, E. Cannan ed.

1904) (1st ed. London 1776).
17 See generally DON D. LESCOHIER, 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 18961932, at 15-47, 293-302 (1935).
Is Id.
19 But not cured: the negotiations between monopolistic unions and monopsonistic employers, a situation of classic bilateral monopoly, will result in fewer employees than under
competition because both sides are trying to restrict the supply of labor. Cf. GEORGE J.
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PaicE 207-08 (3d ed. 1966).
20 See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner); 78 CONG. REc. 3679
(1934) (address by Sen. Wagner); Hearings on S. 2926: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1934) (statement of Dr. Sumner Slichter,
Professor of Economics, Harvard Business School, and William Green, President, AFL); 79
CONG. REC. 267 (1935) (address by Donald Richberg, Executive Director, National Emergency Council); Hearings on S. 1958: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Education and
Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1935) (statement of Charlton Ogburn, counsel for AL),
reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935,
at 15, 20, 95-99, 1291-92, 1531 (1949).
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innovation since 1947 has greatly expanded the scope of labor law,
so that today, as I said at the outset, it extends beyond the regulation of union-organizing activities to embrace the internal governance of unions, racial and other discrimination in labor markets,
the regulation of pension plans, and much else besides. But the
core of modern labor law remains the NLRB's regulation, under
the Wagner Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, of unions'
efforts to organize employees and bargain with the employers on
their behalf.21
Rather than attempt to summarize the relevant statutory provisions and interpretive doctrines, I will try to convey the essential
features of the NLRB's regulation through a description of the
process of union organizing and bargaining as it might occur in a
small industrial plant.2" The process begins with an employee of a
union ("business agent," he is usually called) approaching a
friendly employee of the plant (sometimes the plant employee initiates the contact) and giving him union authorization cards to
hand out to his fellow employees; when signed, these cards authorize the union to represent the employees who sign them.28 The importance of union authorization cards lies in the fact that if a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit (of which more
presently) sign them, the employer may decide to recognize the
union as the workers' exclusive representative for collective bar21 Two other statutes complete the core: the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101115 (1982), which among other things greatly restricts the authority of the federal courts to
issue injunctions in labor cases, and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982),
which imposes a form of compulsory arbitration on the railroad and airline industries. Compulsory arbitration is also a common legal regime for labor relations in the public sector,
which is exempt from the federal labor laws and will not be discussed in this paper, in part
because it is already the subject of a rich, and economically well-informed, literature. See,
e.g., H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER,THE UNIONS AND THE CrrIs (1971); Meltzer & Sunstein,
Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion,and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. Cm.
L. REv. 731, 738-44 (1983). On the economics of compulsory arbitration, see Ashenfelter &
Bloom, Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence, 74 Am. EcoN. REV. 111
(1984).
" The reader who wants greater detail and citations to cases is advised to begin with
ROBERT

A. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT

ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND CoLLzcTrVE BARGAINING

(1976). This is a lucid, compact, and relatively nontechnical introduction to the field. No
extensive knowledge of law is required to be able to read it with understanding and profit.
Also very good and more up-to-date, though longer, is the two-volume THE DEvELOFING
LABOR LAW (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983). For a brief, serviceable description of the federal labor
statutes for nonlawyers, see F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, supra note 5, at 426-52.
23 See R. GORMAN, supra note 22, at 41. The reason the business agent will work
through one or more plant employees, rather than distribute the cards himself, is that the
Board allows the employer to forbid union solicitation on his premises. The Board's position
rests on the practical ground that a stranger's presence on the premises can disrupt work
discipline and in some cases can be a hazard to the employees' safety.
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gaining without the formality of a representation election.2" More
important, if at least thirty percent of the workers sign authorization cards and the employer refuses to recognize the union, the
Board will order a representation election.2 5
The efforts of an employee to induce his fellows to sign union
authorization cards would often, in the absence of legal protection
or of successful concealment by the employee of his activities, be
set at naught by the employer's firing him. This would be an example of rational predatory action.2" It is true that the employer
would impose a cost on himself by firing the worker, assuming that
he was a satisfactory worker (and if he were not, he probably
would have been fired already). But the cost would be small compared with the benefit to the employer of signaling to the remaining employees that if any one of them stepped forward to take the
place of the fired employee as the union's organizer, he would be
fired too. True, if the workers hung together and struck in support
of the fired employee, the balance of costs would be altered and
the employer might back down. But since the workers would be
unorganized (for I am speaking of how an employer might try to
thwart an organizational drive), a strike might be difficult to arrange: the workers would face classic free-rider problems. Those
problems, however, should not be exaggerated. There were independent unions (as well as "company unions," which the Wagner
Act forbade 7) long before the Wagner Act was passed.28 But the
fraction of workers who were unionized rose very rapidly after the
Act was passed, and this is some evidence that it was indeed difficult to organize workers without the protections that the Act extended to union-organizing efforts.
The key protections are in the sections of the Act that entitle
employees to engage in concerted activities and that make it unlawful for the employer to interfere with those activities.2 9 Firing
an employee because he is trying to organize the plant presents a

See id. at 230.
See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1983).
26 For an alternative characterization, see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
27 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
2 For an interesting, if dated, treatment of independent unions, see S. PERLMAN, supra
note 12. Incidentally, chapter 7 contains some interesting discussion of common law attitudes toward labor unions.
29 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 7-8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1982); see also InterCollegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 845 (8th Cir. 1973) ("Conduct having even a 'comparatively slight' impact on employee rights may be a violation of § 8(a)(3), unless the employer has established a legitimate and substantial business justification." (citation
"

omitted)).
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clear case of unlawful interference, as do much milder forms of retaliation-even something as trivial as not inviting the employee to
a company party.3 0 The employer is thus denied the natural advantage that he would have, as one facing many, in fending off organizing activities. In addition, "yellow dog" contracts are forbidden by section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.3 1
Let us assume that the union organizer has gotten signatures
from thirty percent of the employees. The next step chronologically is the election campaign, but before getting to that I must
pause briefly to discuss the electoral unit, or the "bargaining unit"
as it is called. It is not a synonym for the firm, or even for the
plant. Rather, it is any group of employees that the Board decides
is sufficiently homogeneous, and sufficiently distinct from other
employees, to be allowed to form its own bargaining unit.2
Ordinarily, though not always, the unit will be limited to one plant
even if the firm owns other plants as well. Often there will be more
than one unit in the plant or facility. For example, a single hospital, whether or not part of a chain, might contain separate units for
doctors, for registered nurses, for nurses' aides and other maintenance employees, and perhaps for technical employees such as Xray technicians. The Board's discretion in determining the appropriate bargaining unit for a particular type of firm is broad, but
there are some restrictions on it; most important, the Taft-Hartley
Act denies protected status to supervisory employees, from foremen on up, unless their supervisory responsibilities are incidental
33
(e.g., a doctor supervising his secretary).
Only one question is put to the electorate-the members of
the bargaining unit-in the representation election: whether to
make the union that is trying to organize the unit the exclusive
agent of the unit employees for purposes of bargaining with the
employer over wages and working conditions." The outcome of the
election is determined by majority vote of the employees in the
unit, voting by secret ballot.3 5 The election is preceded by a campaign that in some ways is like a political campaign. But it is
shorter, and the voting is on whether to unionize rather than on
candidates for office. Furthermore, the contending parties-union
10 See NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1366-67 (7th Cir. 1983).

29 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
$2See National Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C § 159(b) (1982).
31 See id. (as amended by Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 2(3), 2(11), 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3),
152(11), 157 (1982).
4 See id. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
" See id. § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982).
31
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and employer-are more limited in what they are allowed to say
than are candidates and supporters in political elections: not only
must the employer refrain from firing union adherents or otherwise
interfering with the union's campaign, but he may not threaten retaliation if the union wins or promise specific benefits if the union
loses;36 promises of benefits if the candidate wins are of course a
staple of true political campaigns.
If the union loses a valid representation election, the Board
will not direct another election for a year, 7 and then only if the
union again gets at least thirty percent of the employees to sign
union authorization cards.3 8 If the union wins the election the consequences are more complicated. First, all the employees in the
bargaining unit, whether or not they voted for the union and
whether or not they want to belong to it, are forbidden to bargain
individually with the employer; 9 the union is as much the exclusive bargaining representative of the dissenters as of the employees
who voted for it. Second, all the employees, again regardless of
their personal sympathies, must, if the collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and the union so provides (and it is a
provision for which unions press very hard in negotiations), pay
union dues and often must actually join the union. 40 Third, the
employer must negotiate with the union in good faith for a collective-bargaining agreement that will specify the terms and conditions of employment of the members of the unit 41 for a specified
period, usually one to three years.
But the employer is not required to yield to the union's demands even in part (which makes one wonder whether the duty to
bargain in good faith has much bite), and often he will not. In that
event the union may decide to call a strike in an effort to win at
least partial agreement to its demands. If it does not call a strike,
even though the employer has made no significant concessions to
its demands, the union may lose the workers' support: they will see
that they are getting nothing in exchange for union dues that are
' See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) ("We have no doubt that
[the NLRA] prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately
favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon
their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that
effect.").
'7 See National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1982).
3 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1983).
3' See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
4' See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-44 (1963).
41 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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not trivial.
The economic function of the strike requires consideration at
this point. It is related to the bilateral-monopoly character of labor-management negotiations. When a nonlabor market becomes
cartelized, members of the cartel raise their price and, anticipating
some substitution away from their product by consumers, reduce
output, but not to zero. But if there were only one consumer for
the cartel's product, he might say to the cartel, "I won't buy from
you at the higher price," and they would then face the choice of
either backing down or not selling to him. This happens occasionally in nonlabor markets, but in labor markets it happens often.
The union deals with a single employer (or several employers bargaining as one in a multi-employer bargaining unit), who may be
tempted to refuse to accept the union's demands (i.e., may
threaten to buy nothing rather than come to terms), and then the
union must either strike in order to enforce its terms or else back
down. The union cannot just write off this "customer" as marginal,
as a product monopolist often can when he raises his price; for
each employer's work force will be represented by its own local
union (often more than one), and if the union ignores the workers'
interests they will vote the union out and the employer will be free
to go his own way. Thus we have a classic example of bilateral monopoly: the union and employer can deal only with each other and
a refusal to deal, by imposing costs on the other party, makes him
more likely to come to terms. The strike imposes costs on both
parties: on the employer, by forcing him to reduce or cease production, and on the workers, by stopping their wages. The balance of
those costs will determine the ultimate settling point between the
union's initial demand and the employer's initial offer.
Labor law affects these costs. For example, the Board allows
the employer, if there is a strike, to hire replacements for the striking workers.' 2 He is even allowed to offer the replacement workers
permanent jobs-and to do so even if such an offer would not be
necessary to induce them to work for him. It would never be necessary if the employer were permitted to pay a wage high enough
to induce a replacement to work temporarily, without promise of a
permanent job. But the employer is not permitted to pay replacement workers a higher wage than he paid the workers who have
struck. This rule shifts the balance the other way; it limits the em42 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & TeL Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) ("Nor [is] it an
unfair labor practice to replace the striking employes with others in an effort to carry on the
business.").
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ployer's ability to hire replacements, permanent or temporary.
Although, subject to this qualification, the employer may hire
permanent replacements, he may not fire the striking workers who
have been replaced. 43 True, unless the strike was provoked by an
employer's unfair labor practice, the employer does not have to reinstate all of the strikers as soon as the strike ends or pay any of
them their back wages. But when the strike is over, those strikers
whose places have been filled by permanent replacements must be
put at the head of the queue, to be reinstated as vacancies appear,
and those strikers whose places have not been filled must be rein44
stated immediately.
Attempts to defeat strikes by hiring replacement workers are
less common than one might expect; more common is the use of
supervisory personnel to replace the striking workers temporarily
(hence the importance of the National Labor Relations Act's exclusion of such personnel from the Act's protections). The problem
with using replacement workers is that in order to get to the workplace they will have to cross the picket line thrown up by the striking workers' union. Even though picketers are not legally privileged to use force to prevent the crossing of picket lines, whether
by replacement workers or by customers or suppliers of the picketed establishment, there is often a latent threat of violence (which
cannot, however, be used as a ground for firing or enjoining a picketer 45 ), especially against replacement workers ("scabs"). And in
pro-union communities the police may not have the desire or ability to control this threat effectively (though they may come down
hard on any effort by the employer to hire "goons" to intimidate
the picketers). Usually the picketing workers can at the very least
identify the replacement workers, who may therefore fear eventual
retaliation even if the picketing itself is completely peaceful. Their
fear will be enhanced by the Act's provision forbidding the employer to fire striking workers. When the strikers eventually return
to work, they will be working side-by-side with the permanent
replacements, who may entertain fears for their own safety or at
least for the continued congeniality of the workplace.

43 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) preserves the strikers' status as "employees" protected by
the NLRA. See also NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967) ("[Ulnless the
employer who refuses to reinstate strikers can show that his action was due to 'legitimate
and substantial business justifications,' he is guilty of an unfair labor practice." (citation
omitted)).
44 See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967).
45 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 359, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB
v. W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1977).
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If a collective-bargaining contract between union and employer is signed, with or without a strike, it will be judicially enforceable in accordance with a federal common law of collectivebargaining contracts. 46 Often such contracts contain no-strike
clauses, and if such a clause is violated, the employer may be able
to get an injunction against the strike and an award of damages
against the union. 47 Whether or not there is a no-strike clause, a
"wildcat" strike-a strike not authorized by the union-is not protected activity if it has a tendency to interfere with the union's role
as exclusive bargaining representative; 8 and if a strike is unprotected, the employer can fire the wildcat strikers with impunity.
Unlike an elected public official, a union that is elected to be
the collective-bargaining representative of some unit does not serve
a fixed term. But upon a showing that the union probably has lost
majority support the employer can file an election petition or can
refuse to bargain with the union and thus force the union to file
such a petition. 49 In such a case the Board will order a new election
if at least one year has elapsed since the union was certified as the
unit's bargaining representative.5
II. UNIONS AS LABOR CARTELS
Cognoscenti of labor law will recognize the preceding discussion as but a crude thumbnail sketch of the law of collective bargaining. But it will serve to frame an inquiry into the economic
logic of that law. My discussion will be illustrative rather than exhaustive: multi-employer bargaining, secondary boycotts, and antitrust restrictions on union activity are among the relevant topics
that I have omitted in the interests of time and space.
If unionization is a means of cartelizing labor markets, the National Labor Relations Act, which even with the Taft-Hartley
amendments plainly fosters unionization, is likewise a means to
cartelize such markets. Economists have long treated unions as labor cartels,5 1 though alternative explanations have been adTextile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252-54 (1970).
48See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70-73
(1975) (unauthorized strike by minority employees to protest discrimination not protected
46
4

by NLRA).

4 See National Labor Relations Act § 9(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1982).
See id. § 9(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2), (1982).
* See, e.g., J. HIRSCHInER, supra note 8, at 380-82; G. STILER, supra note 19, at 26870; Friedman, Some Comments on the Significance of Labor Unions for Economic Policy,
in THE IMPACT OF THE UNION 204 (D. Wright ed. 1951); Lazear, A Microeconomic Theory of
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vanced.52 One is that the way in which unions benefit their members is not by reducing the supply of labor (and hence forcing up
the price, i.e., wages), but by increasing the productivity of the
work force.5 3 This they are said to do in various ways. One is by
providing a vehicle for collecting, and communicating to the employer, workers' complaints about wages and working conditions."
In the absence of such a vehicle, it is argued, workers might be
afraid to voice their complaints, and the employer would learn of
them only indirectly and belatedly, by observing a higher quit rate.
Another example: unions invariably press for inclusion, in any collective-bargaining contracts that they negotiate, of a provision forbidding management to fire workers except for good cause, and requiring it, when it lays off workers because of an economic
downturn, to lay them off in reverse order of seniority (i.e., juniors
first). When such job security is lacking, as is usually the case in
nonunion firms, the older, more experienced workers may-it is argued-be reluctant to share their know-how with the younger,
newer employees, fearing that if they do the younger employees
will then be competing for their jobs. As a result of this reluctance,
productivity is thought to suffer.
Although some empirical support has been marshaled for this
productivity-enhancement theory of unionization, "5 the theory is
extremely hard to accept. It is inconsistent with the fundamental
assumption of economics: that people, in this case employers, are
rational profit or utility maximizers. Although this assumption
may not hold true in all settings, the behavior of business employers towards their employees is one setting where it probably does.
Labor Unions, in NEw APPROACHES TO LABOR UNIONS, supra note 7, at 53; Machlup, Monopolistic Wage Determinationsas a Partof the GeneralProblem of Monopoly, in CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ECONOMIC INSTrrUTE ON WAGE DETERMINATION AND THE
ECONOMICS OF LIBERALISM 49 (1947); Reder, Unionism, Wages, and ContractEnforcement,

in NEw APPROACHES TO LABOR UNIONS, supra note 7, at 27; Simons, Some Reflections on
Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 1, 6-9 (1944); Viner, The Role of Costs in a System of Economic Liberalism, in CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNTED STATES, supra, at 15.
52 See, e.g., Brown & Medoff, Trade Unions in the Production Process, 86 J. POL.

ECON. 355 (1978); Freeman, Individual Mobility and Union Voice in the Labor Market, 66
Am. EcON. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 361 (1976); Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PuB. INTEREST 69 (1979); Lester, Reflections on the "LaborMonopoly" Issue, 55 J.
POL. ECON. 513 (1947); and for an able summary, Leslie, supra note 9, at 910-20.
53 See, e.g., Brown & Medoff, supra note 52, at 356-59; Freeman, supra note 52, at 365.
4 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 52, at 366 (unionism is a "market mechanism for imparting information, aggregating preferences, [and] altering authority relations"); see also
Freeman & Medoff, supra note 52, at 70-74.
55 See Brown & Medoff, supra note 52, at 362-69; Freeman & Medoff, supra note 52, at
78-87.
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If granting his employees tenure will increase their productivity,
the rational employer will do so, for this will reduce his costs of
production. Even if the whole productivity gain is paid to the employee in the form of a higher wage, the employer will be better off.
He will have lower total costs than his competitors and will therefore be able to expand his output relative to theirs and increase his
profits. Even if only a single employer in a competitive industry
tumbled to the advantages of granting tenure, competition would
force the others to follow suit." And so with encouraging workers
to complain rather than waiting for them to quit: the rational employer will encourage them to complain, by cash rewards or
whatever it takes, if worker turnover is costly to him.
The proposition that unions enhance productivity also flies in
the face of massive, if unsystematic, evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion. Featherbedding seems a more common attribute of
unionized than of nonunionized work forces (at least in the private
sector); many industries that are heavily unionized are notable for
their low productivity; and for every older worker whom job security encourages to share his know-how, casual observation suggests
that there is at least one other older worker, and probably several,
whom job security protects at the expense of a more efficient
younger worker. Most important of all, for many generations now
employers have expended substantial resources to prevent unionization of their plants-expenditures that would be irrational if it
were true that unions enhanced labor productivity. Such persistent
irrationality by American businessmen is very hard to credit, but it
is a proposition entailed by the productivity-enhancement theory
of unionization.
It seems far more plausible to assume that the intended and
actual effect of unionization is to raise the price of labor above the
competitive level, and to depress the supply of labor below the
competitive level, in the unionized sector (about twenty percent of
the American work force is unionized 57). This view not only is commonsensical but explains a wide range of phenomena. It explains
the support of unions for the minimum wage, which has the effect
of raising the price of substitute nonunion labor, and for government regulation of workplace safety, which reduces competition
from nonunion employers. It also explains the pattern of unioniza-

"These points are neglected by Freeman & Medoff, supra note 52, at 91-93, in their
attempt to explain management opposition to independent unions.
57 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. Dmr. oF CoMMfERc, STATiSTCAL ABsTRAcT OF THE
UNrrE STATES 408 (103d ed. 1982-1983).
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tion in the American economy, which is about what one would predict from differences in the ability to cartelize the labor supply in
different industries. Thus we predict that we will find, and do find,
the most effective unions in industries where competition among
employers is weak (often because of government regulation), the
cost of the organized work force is a small part of the employer's
total costs, and the employer produces a nonstorable commodity,
so that a strike will impose heavy costs on him. Excellent examples
of all three factors (all of which are different aspects of labor-supply inelasticity) are found in the airline pilots' union before the
deregulation of the airline industry and in the railroad industry in
its heyday, where unionization took hold long before government
came directly to its aid. Finally, as we will now see, the cartel theory of unionization explains better than any alternative theory the
dominant features of the regulation of labor relations by the National Labor Relations Board.
The theory of cartels 8 teaches that cartelization of a market is
a very difficult, perhaps hopeless, endeavor if there are a large
number of competitors. And that is the typical situation in labor
markets. It is not only that the work force of all but the smallest
employers will contain far more members than has been thought
the limit for effective cartelization without government assistance
(a critical qualification in the present context, obviously); in addition, the relevant market includes workers employed by other
firms (or unemployed) who, for a slightly higher wage, would go to
work for an employer facing a strike.
These workers are an important part of the relevant market.
In the theory of cartels, potential entrants are important only
when the number of firms actually selling in the market-a number corresponding in the labor market to the number of employees
actually selling their services to the employer in question-is
small. If the number of significant firms is large (the qualification
being added to exclude the case where a few firms have most of the
sales and there is an unimportant fringe of tiny firms), cartelization probably will fail because each firm can expand its output and
will be irresistibly tempted to do so if others reduce their output.
(If none could expand its output, then a reduction in output by
even a single firm would push the market price above the competi8

For a discussion of the theory of cartels, see RicHARD A. POSNFR, ANTITRUST LAW: AN

39-77 (1976); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
39-63 (1968); McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant
Marine, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 191, 196-201 (1960).
ECONOMIC PERSPECTV
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tive level because the market's total output would be smaller as a
result of that reduction.) Now it is easier for a firm to expand its
output than for an individual worker to do so. The firm can add to
its work force or to its capital; the individual worker would have to
work harder or work longer hours. Of course this is possible within
limits, especially for a short time. And a short time may sometimes
be good enough: since a strike is costly to the striking workers,
keeping the firm operating for a short time may be sufficient to
break the strike even if the firm is forced to contract its operations-provided it is not forced to shut down completely. But if
the strikers have more staying power than this, their strike may be
effective though far fewer than all the workers join it, for the remaining workers may not be able to take up the slack by working
harder, or for longer hours, for as long as it would take to break
the strike. The strike might last too long for nonstriking workers or
supervisors to be able to keep the plant operating and too long for
the employer to substitute capital inputs for the labor inputs no
longer available to it. In either case the firm's ability to hire replacement workers from other employers or from the pool of unemployed workers could determine the success or failure of the
strike.
The large number of potential competitors of the striking
workers is such a large obstacle to cartelizing labor markets without governmental assistance that most union-organizing efforts
probably would be ineffectual without such assistance, provided
the government enforced against unions as against the rest of society the basic laws protecting rights of property, contract, and personal safety (so that unions could not use force or the threat of
force to achieve their ends). We now have to consider how the National Labor Relations Act alleviates the large-number problem
and in other ways fosters effective if incomplete cartelization of
labor markets.
To begin with, through the concept of the employer unfair labor practice, the Act prevents the employer from engaging in the
kind of rational predatory activity that, as I suggested earlier,
could be used to defeat unionization in its incipient stage. Put differently (for those, skeptical of the economic rationality of predatory behavior in any form), the Act prevents competition between
two groups of workers: those willing to work for the competitive
wage and those willing to devote time to (and take risks in the
hope of) obtaining a higher wage through unionization. The employer is forbidden to substitute members of the former group for
members of the latter; it is as if a consumer were forbidden to
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switch his patronage to price cutters.
Next, the Act increases the wealth of unions and thus helps
them play their vital role as agents for organizing workers. The
union's role corresponds to that of trade associations, exclusive
sales agencies, the old railroad rate bureaus, and other institutions
for organizing competitors in product markets, but the union is
more essential because of the large number of competitors to be
organized. The Act, as interpreted by the Board and the courts,
helps unions in several ways. It forbids the employer during the
union-organizing campaign to offer (or even promise) its workers
the higher wages or better fringe benefits that the union has promised to press for. Such an offer, if accepted, would undermine the
union by preventing it from recouping the expenses of organizing
by collecting union dues. The Act protects unions from another
form of free riding by forbidding workers, after the union has been
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative, to negotiate
separately with the employer and by empowering the union, without regard to the wishes of individual members, to negotiate a provision in the collective-bargaining contract requiring all members
of the bargaining unit to pay union dues.5 9 Such a provision prevents an individual worker from obtaining the benefits of unionization without paying his share of the costs. Without dues, unions
could not function. Indeed, assuming that what unions seek to
maximize is their dues income,"0 if there is competition between
unions that income will be proportionate to the benefits that the
union confers on the workers it represents. The union's income
would in any case be much less if a worker could enjoy the benefits
conferred by the union without paying any dues.
The devices for preventing free riding on a union's organizing
and other activities are very far from being perfect. If an employer,
in an effort to discourage a union from organizing his workers, pays
a wage that is less than the union scale by a smaller margin than
the union's dues-as he can do without violating the Act-both the
workers and the employer will be better off than if the union or" The Taft-Hartley Act, however, allows the states to forbid "union security clauses,"
as they are called, see National Labor Relations Act (as amended by Taft-Hartley Act)
§ 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982), and a number of states, disproportionately southern, have
taken up this option, see, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 25-7-30 to -36 (1975); GA. CODE Am. § 34-6-21
to -28 (1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47 (1972).
So There is great debate over just what it is that unions maximize. For a discussion of
contending positions, see DONALD L. MARTIN, AN OWNERSHIP THEORY OF TiE TRADE UNION
6-30 (1980). Dues maximization seems the natural assumption but is not essential to my
analysis.
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ganizes the workers. Yet it is only the threat of unionization that
enables this benefit to be obtained, and the union receives no compensation for creating it. Furthermore, although every worker must
pay union dues once the union has become the collective-bargaining agent for his unit and has negotiated a union security clause
with the employer, the union cannot force the workers to honor a
strike calls' (unless they are union members-not just dues-payers-and have not quit the union before crossing the picket line 2).
Much like the fringe firm in a cartelized market, the individual
worker may seek the best of both worlds by continuing to work
during the strike while hoping that the union will succeed in wresting concessions from the employer so that after the strike the
worker's wages will be higher as a result of it. If enough workers
think this way, the strike will fail and all the workers may be worse
off than if they had joined it. But this is the same phenomenon as
occurs when a cartel of product sellers fails because of defections
by members of the cartel who think they can have the best of all
worlds by free riding. Such failures are common.
What limits the form of free riding that consists of refusing to
honor a strike call is a practical sanction that has no counterpart
in nonlabor markets. The worker who continues to work during the
strike knows that once it is over he will be working side-by-side
with the workers who struck (unless all of their places are filled by
permanent replacements), and he may fear retaliation in forms difficult to detect and prevent. Even if the strikers have been permanently replaced, the workers who refused to honor the strike will
know that the strikers may eventually come back to work because,
as noted earlier, the Act puts the strikers at the head of the queue
to be hired (technically, reinstated) when vacancies occur. The
prospect of eventually finding oneself working side-by-side with
the former strikers will not only increase the likelihood that a
strike call will be honored by all; it will also, as I mentioned earlier,
discourage some new workers from signing on as permanent
replacements in the first place, especially since they cannot be paid
a higher wage for doing so.
Genuinely peaceful picketing is thus the counterpart in the la61 See NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 215-18 (1972).
42 There is divided authority on a union's right to prevent an employee from resigning
from the union during a strike. Compare Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57
(7th Cir. 1983) (allowing resignation), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1984),
and International Assoc. of Machinists, Local 1414, 270 N.L.R.B. Dec. No. 209 (June 22,
1984) (same), with Local 1327, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir.
1984) (prohibiting resignation).
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bor setting of the practice (required, for example, in the rail and
trucking industries by the Interstate Commerce Act) of pricing in
accordance with published tariffs. The published tariff shores up a
cartel by enabling competitors to detect cheating on the cartel
price immediately. Picketing serves a similar function by enabling
the striking workers, corresponding to the members of a cartel who
observe the cartel price, to identify any member of the cartel (i.e.,
any fellow worker) who is cheating by continuing to work during
the strike. In this analysis, picketing is not really an informative
activity (setting aside the information that is implicit in any
threat); it is an information-gathering activity.6 8
The cartel analogy may help explain why unions invariably insist that the collective-bargaining contract provide some form of
job security. No doubt, part of the reason is merely to back up the
law's prohibition of discrimination against union supporters,6 but
the theory of cartels suggests a further point. An important object
of job-security provisions is to obtain preferential treatment for
senior workers. Some workers laid off during a business downturn
will find other jobs during the period of layoff and not return to
their original employer, who will therefore be hiring replacements
for them. And just by the workings of chance, these replacements
may be less well disposed to the union than those who were laid off
and later quit. So the union will want some criterion for the order
of layoffs that will ensure so far as possible that those workers who
are least likely to favor the union will be laid off first. These are
the younger workers.
Much casual observation supports this proposition, but it also
has a theoretical basis. Younger workers are more mobile than
older ones. The older ones are more likely to have family obligations that make it difficult to relocate geographically, and their
" This has possible implications for the analysis of the first amendment rights of pickets, but I shall not attempt to develop those implications here.
"Besides overt discrimination, employers might find subtle ways of discouraging
unionization. For example, workers must differ in their propensity to vote for unions, to go
out on strike, and otherwise to engage in cartel-promoting behavior. Therefore, in the absence of contractual job protection, the employer, after discovering that a majority of his
workers wanted a union, might discharge some of the workers at random. (I am now assuming that he would not try to discharge solely, or disproportionately, those whom he knew to
be union adherents, because that would be clearly unlawful conduct.) His hope would be
that the replacement workers might, simply by chance, contain a lower proportion of union
supporters, so that he might eventually be able to get the union decertified. Of course this
would be a sensible strategy only if the employer thought that union support among his
existing work force was above average for his industry, location, etc. The strategy would
violate the law, but would be more difficult to detect than the firing of just (or mainly)
union supporters.
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human capital may have become specialized to the particular job
they are doing for their employer (assuming that the older worker,
on average, has worked longer for this employer than has the
younger worker). Many younger workers are temporary employees,
trying out one job after another; some are teenagers working parttime and bound for very different careers. Being less mobile, the
older workers are more at the mercy of the employer (like shareholders whose shares are not freely tradable) and therefore have
more to gain even in the short run from unionization. They also
are more likely to be around to enjoy the benefits that the union
generates for the workers in exchange for dues (the collection of
dues begins before any of those benefits are realized). True, the
younger workers, if they do stick around, will enjoy those benefits
longer. But the discount rate applied to benefits from unionization
other than those that can be realized in the immediate future must
be high, not because workers are short-sighted, but because the
union may be decertified or the plant closed before the benefits are
realized. An additional point is that, at least in jobs that require
strength or stamina, older workers may be less productive than
younger workers, with whom-but for union-negotiated seniority
protection-the older workers would be competing.
If this analysis is right, then by requiring the younger workers
to be laid off first, the union is less likely to lose union adherents
than if layoffs were random with respect to age. Moreover, they
would never be random. The employer not confined by a collectivebargaining agreement would want to lay off the least productive
workers first. They are likely to be disproportionately older and in
any event disproportionately pro-union, for it is the least productive employees (whatever the reason why they are least productive)
who fare the worst if wages are determined on a competitive basis.
This analysis also explains why unions want employers to use
seniority to determine the order of layoffs even though productivity might be maximized, to the mutual benefit of employer and
employees, if the union allowed the employer to choose whom to
lay off in return for the generous compensation of any older worker
laid off. Even if senior workers were made whole, there would still
be a disadvantage from the union's standpoint: some of those laid
off would find other jobs and therefore not return to their original
employer when the layoff ended, and they would be replaced by
younger workers less likely to support the union. Finally, we
should note that a seniority rule, by making the employer's work
force less mobile (senior workers have more to lose from quitting),
generates additional support for the union.

1008

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:988

Another important factor facilitating or retarding the organization of a plant or other facility is the determination of the bargaining unit (the electoral unit for the representation election). In
general, the larger the unit the better off the employer is, and the
smaller the unit the better off the union is. 5 The larger the unit
is-that is, the more employees it has-the more difficult it will be
for the union to obtain the majority vote that it needs in order to
be designated the exclusive bargaining representative for the unit.
This is not only because it takes more resources in absolute terms
to get more votes (a national political election is more costly than a
local one), but also because the members of the unit are more
likely to have divergent interests with respect to tradeoffs among
wages, fringe benefits, job security, and workplace safety. This will
make it difficult for the union to appeal to a majority and, even if
it gets a majority, will make it difficult for the union to formulate a
coherent set of demands and enforce those demands by an effective strike threat. This is much like the problem of fixing prices in
a producers' cartel when the producers have dissimilar cost
functions.
A potentially offsetting factor is that a strike by a small unit
may not impose substantial costs on the employer, in which event
the union and the workers will gain little (in dues and in wages,
respectively) from a successful organizing campaign, even if it is
cheap to conduct. But if the unit is small precisely because the
workers who comprise it do a different type of work from the other
workers in the plant (so that making them a part of a larger unit
would result in a heterogeneous unit), it is quite possible that if
they go out on strike the plant will have to close down; the work
they do, not being duplicated elsewhere in the plant, may well be
essential. In addition, a small unit may be large relative to the size
of the plant or facility in question. Both points are illustrated by
health-care facilities (mainly hospitals and nursing homes), where
unions have made great strides since the NLRB's authority was
extended to nonprofit health-care facilities in 1974.66 A hospital
may have a small number of employees overall, divided as I noted
earlier into several units (doctors, registered nurses, etc.), and a
strike by any unit might close the facility down. Since the employer cannot produce for inventory, it will incur very substantial
costs from even a short strike. This is why the law requires that

" See R. Go AN, supra note 22, at 67-68.
" See Health Care Institutions Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 169, 183 (1982)).
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unions give ten days' notice of a strike in a health-care facility;67 it
is another example of how current law tempers the pro-union policy introduced by the Wagner Act.
Professor Douglas Leslie has suggested that unions would
often be better off with larger units because this would facilitate
the mediation of conflicts among subgroups of employees. 8 If you
have three local unions in a plant, however, their presidents should
be able to negotiate some arrangement for mutual support; it is a
negotiation among just three people, which the Coase Theorem
suggests should be feasible, though there are possible "trilateral
monopoly" problems and additional complications stemming from
the fact that they will be negotiating in a representative capacity.
But if the negotiation is within a unit, no faction has a representative who can negotiate on its behalf; the costs of negotiation will
therefore be (I should think) higher; and if so the probability of
unresolved conflict will also be higher. I am therefore led to predict
that in periods when the NLRB is dominated by Democrats
(whom most union leaders support), the Board will tend to certify
smaller bargaining units than in periods when Republicans dominate. This would be a fruitful subject for empirical research.
If I am right in my contention that the National Labor Relations Act is best understood as a means of federal governmental
support for the cartelization of the labor supply, this may also illuminate another feature of the Act: the vesting of primary responsibility for enforcing it in an administrative agency, the NLRB,
rather than in the courts. Since the Act turned labor policy on its
head, transforming a public policy of fostering competitive determination of wages and working conditions into one of fostering
cartelization, it was quite sensible for Congress to be concerned
that state and federal judges-who after all had largely fashioned
the former policy-might resist its inversion. It would have made
less sense if all the Act were doing was enhancing labor productivity-though Congress might have feared that the judges would
misunderstand that this is what the Act was doing.
All that was years ago, and now there are very few judges,
state or federal, who have any emotional or intellectual commitment to competitive labor markets. Although the word "cartelization" has negative overtones (more so, indeed, than in the 1930's,
when the Depression was attributed in some quarters to excessive
67 See National Labor Relations Act (as amended by Health Care Institutions Amendments Act) § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1982).
" Leslie, supra note 9, at 50.
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competition), I am sure that most judges today would agree that if
federal labor policy is one of facilitating the cartelization of labor,
they should, and without much pain can, use this policy to guide
them in reviewing the decisions of the NLRB. The only real difficulty is that with the Taft-Hartley amendments, the National Labor Relations Act no longer evinces a univocal policy of promoting
cartelization. Even in its pristine Wagner Act form, the NLRA did
not totally embrace such a policy. For example, the Act has since
the early days been interpreted to allow employers to replace strikers, and has also been interpreted not to protect concerted activity
that involves a danger of physical destruction (e.g., damaging the
employer's machinery) or personal injury. 9 The rationale of this
exception is not quite so obvious to an economist as it might appear to be. Strikes that destroy much more valuable intangible assets are protected. But there is a difference, and the exception for
destruction of tangible assets does limit the power of unions. Destroying intangible assets (business goodwill, customers' time, etc.)
usually requires a lengthy strike, which is costly to the workers as
well as to the employer, his customers, and his suppliers; equally
costly destruction of tangible assets might be accomplished in
minutes.
A more ambiguous example of a limitation on the union-promoting policy of the Act (as it has been interpreted) is the requirement that the union get at least thirty percent of the workers in
the bargaining unit to sign union authorization cards before a representation election will be ordered. It is not obvious that lowering
the threshold would promote unionization. A weak union might get
enough signatures to compel an election, then lose it resoundingly
and by doing so make it harder for a stronger union to organize the
plant subsequently.
But the Taft-Hartley Act did make a difference. Notably, by
withholding the protection of federal law from supervisor unions
(and as a result there are few such unions and most are powerless),
the Act strengthened the hand of employers by enabling them to
substitute for strikers other workers less likely than permanent
replacements to be intimidated by returning strikers. It also outlawed the closed shop70 which is a device that minimizes free rid"' See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939) ("We are unable
to conclude that Congress intended to ... invest those who go on strike with an immunity
from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer's property .... 1).
70 See National Labor Relations Act (as amended by Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982).
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ing on union efforts by requiring the employer to hire from the
ranks of those who already belong to the union, thus excluding
those who join after the plant has been organized.
But the impact of the Taft-Hartley Act is easily exaggerated,
as another example will show. Although the Act made no-strike
clauses enforceable by damage suits against unions, it is very hard
to see this provision as anti-union. A union doesn't have to agree
to such a clause; and if it does, presumably it has been compensated for it. Expanding freedom of contract ought to benefit all
parties to a potential transaction. It would be different if the Act
allowed "yellow dog" contracts. Those are not contracts between
unions and employers but between individual workers and employers and are a device by which employers can exploit the large-numbers problem that complicates unions' organizing efforts. Each
worker knows that his signing an agreement with his employer not
to strike while he is employed will have little effect on the success
of any union organizing efforts in his plant because he is one of
many; knowing this, he will sign such an agreement for only a
modest consideration. If all or at least most workers think the
same way (and why shouldn't they?), the employer will have succeeded in preventing union organizing at his plant for a total cost
that may be much less than he would have to pay in higher wages
if the plant were organized (provided there is not already in being
a strong union that can pay the workers more than the company
can pay to induce them not to sign "yellow dog" contracts). The
banning of "yellow dog" contracts (accomplished in the Norris-LaGuardia Act a few years before the Wagner Act) not only is a rational component of a labor policy dedicated to facilitating labor
cartels but is perfectly consistent with the provision in the TaftHartley Act allowing no-strike clauses to be enforced. Indeed, the
federal labor laws as a whole appear to have a remarkable consistency and intelligibility when viewed as a legal regime for fostering
(though not to the maximum possible extent) the cartelization of
labor markets.

